A Plan for Molotov

By FREDA UTLEY

There is little doubt that if Molotov had played it soft at Berlin it would have been well-nigh impossible for America to stem the tide of appeasement running high in England as well as in France. As it turned out, the Soviet government refused to pander to the strong desire of our two most valued Western allies to be deceived. But should Molotov, at the conference in Geneva, play the role of the Sun instead of the North Wind, there is little doubt that Britain and France will insist we throw aside our defense cloak.

For ever since Stalin's death practically the whole of the French press and the greater part of the British, encouraged by Winston Churchill, have been propagating the myth that there has been a "change of heart" in the Kremlin. And as if the Europeans had not got enough appeasers or wishful thinkers of their own, the United Press during the Berlin Conference was distributing Henry Shapiro's articles "proving" that since Stalin's death a new day has dawned in Soviet Russia. [See account of these articles by Robert Donlevin, the FREEMAN, April 5.] When I asked a representative of one of Germany's largest and most influential newspapers why it was printing Shapiro's stuff, he replied: "Surely since he is sponsored by the U.P. and is representing this great American news agency at the Berlin Conference, Mr. Shapiro must be a reliable authority expressing informed American opinion."

As F.T.P. Veale, author of *Advance to Barbarism*, wrote me from England:

> All that was required of Mr. Molotov was that he should express a few platitudes and make a few gestures. Instantly there would have burst forth a storm of gratification—Stalin and all his works had been swept away, the Russians were again delightful and trustworthy people, and there was no longer any need to worry about taking precautions against an attack by them. If only Molotov had played the modest role expected of him, an already prepared campaign would have been immediately launched—a pro-Russian and anti-German campaign with a strong, thinly disguised anti-American bias.

Leon Dennen, Russian-born correspondent of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, told me in Berlin that it was clear from reading *Pravda* and *Izvestia* that there was strong opposition in the Kremlin junta to Molotov's tactics. Evidently, he said, the Soviet Foreign Minister's opponents were in favor of a softer approach, which they believed could win most from the West. So it may be that although Molotov justified his Stalinist attitude at Berlin by making us agree to the Geneva Conference, the more intelligent men in the Kremlin will have their own way at Geneva, in which case we shall be in greater danger then ever.

The Kremlin can hardly lose, whichever cards it plays. For although the West holds most of the trumps, there is every assurance they will not be played. Moscow can continue to rely for ultimate victory on such factors as:

The weakness, illogicality, venality, and outdated narrow nationalism of French politicians, combined with France's hysterical fear of Germany as contrasted with its ignorance, or blindness, concerning the Soviet menace;

Winston Churchill's overwhelming desire to justify his war record of all-out collaboration with Stalin by achieving "peace" in what time remains to him; coupled with Britain's overriding interest in trade with the Soviet world at any price.

Last, but not least, the influence in America of wishful thinkers and anti-anti-Communists, and the continuing failure of our State Department and press to understand adequately either the nature and aims of the Soviet dictatorship, or the causes of Communist influence elsewhere in the world.

An example of the failure of our "statesmen" to realize what we are up against was Mr. Dulles' radio speech of February 24, in which he said that "we should remain ever watchful for a sign from the Soviet rulers that they realize that freedom is not something to be frightened by, but something to be accepted." Mr. Dulles is, undoubtedly, strongly anti-Communist by religious and political conviction. But this remark shows a failure to understand that the Soviet dictatorship does *not* represent the Russian people. Otherwise he would realize that the men in the Kremlin have everything to fear from freedom, since it would inevitably entail their own liquidation.

Delusions about the Enemy

"Thrice armed is he whose cause is just." But what of the just who discard their armor because they imagine that the enemy also cares about justice or freedom or the "good opinion of mankind." So experienced a columnist as Anne O'Hare McCormick wrote on January 20, 1954, that the American delegation in Berlin had been "astonished" to find the Soviet government was "not interested in what the German people thought," but in "how Russia could get control of the apparatus of power, or at least prevent the West from getting control." As if, in this year of grace, anyone should be astonished to learn the Communists are interested only in consolidating and extending their power!

Another factor in the situation which is of great advantage to the Communists is the nostalgia of the West for the bad old days of our collaboration with Soviet Russia, and the refusal of most

of our opinion makers and politicians to admit their past blunders and lack of principle.

In general the American press, too, avoids re-examining the past in favor of preserving the illusion that Roosevelt's "unconditional surrender" policy and the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam agreements were justified. The danger which results from this pretense is that the public can be persuaded that future agreements with Moscow and Peiping are both possible and desirable.

It has already been proved that Mr. Dulles was wrong when he said, following the Berlin Conference, that the Soviet "alternatives to Western planning" are so repellent that even France would recognize the necessity of permitting western Germany to rearm. On the contrary, the French are not only showing less and less inclination to ratify the European Defense Community treaty. On March 19, after Dr. Adenauer's government had managed to persuade the Bonn Parliament to amend the Constitution to permit German rearmament for the defense of Europe, the Allied High Commissioners intervened at French insistence to delay President Heuss' signature to the constitutional amendment. Finally, France was persuaded to withdraw her veto on condition that Germany should never rearm except within the confines of the EDC treaty.

France would never have dared to take such action were it not for the encouragement given at Berlin to the French politicians who want peace at any price in Indo-China, and who, having never liked the European Defense treaty, would be delighted to sacrifice it for the sake of an entente with Moscow and Peiping.

As the *New York Times* said in an editorial February 25: "The Geneva Conference can become a trap only if France permits herself to be lured into abandonment of the European Defense Community and her own safety in return for a 'peace' in Indo-China that can be broken the next day."

The one thing wrong with this statement is the word "only." For, as the *New York Times'* own Paris correspondent reported on March 21, U. S. officials have "reluctantly come to the conclusion that the French government wants to preserve the European Defense Community issue as a bargaining point at Geneva," on the assumption that throwing EDC into the discard will be "the price exacted for a settlement in Indo-China."

At Geneva Mr. Dulles will have to contend not only with the French appeasers. He will also face the more formidable opposition of the British empire. Sir Gladwyn Jebb has publicly stated that the Chinese Communists should be admitted to the U. N. provided they "purge themselves" of their aggression in Korea and Indo-China. Mr. Lester Pearson, Canada's Minister of External Affairs, has declared that we ought to take "a more realistic, less emotional look" at Communist China, provided she refrains from any "fresh acts of aggression." And Mr. St. Laurent, the Canadian Prime Minister, after conferring with Nehru, announced in Manila in March that Canada must sooner or later recognize Communist China as "the government that the people want." Meanwhile Adlai Stevenson has been busy preaching the old Lattimore line, as when he said in a speech at Harvard March 19: "In Asia Communism has the advantage of the great weight of the New China's power and attraction."

Betrayal of Asian Allies

The stage is set for our abandonment of the Chinese Nationalist Government, and in the course of time, also of Syngman Rhee. The betrayal, urged upon us by the British and French, need not take the obvious form of recognition of the Peiping government and its admission to the U. N. What the Communists want now is not *de jure* recognition of Peiping but trade with the Western world for the purpose of preparing themselves to attack and destroy us in the future. They will be well satisfied if we agree to supply them with the sinews of war even if we remain outwardly loyal to our old ally, Chiang Kai-shek.

It is all too obvious that Mr. Dulles faces not only a hard, but a well-nigh impossible task at Geneva. He cannot at the same time satisfy Britain and France and the American people and Congress. The former are clearly ready to let the Far East go for a few paper promises from Moscow and Peiping, making it possible for France to retire gracefully from Indo-China, and for Britain to resume unrestricted trade with Red China and the rest of the Soviet empire.

The Secretary of State's speech on March 29 shows that he will make a valiant effort not to give way to appeasement pressures. But since the American people are prepared neither to risk war now before Moscow is ready to attack us, nor to appease the Communists for the sake of peace in our time and to please our faint-hearted allies, there seems no solution for Mr. Dulles' problem. He may have only himself to blame for the impossible assignment he is faced with at Geneva. However, it seemed to me while in Berlin during the first two weeks of the conference that Dulles, having first adopted a high moral and also politically realistic position, was being forced to climb down from it by Washington as well as by Paris and London. For instance, according to information given me by two correspondents who attended his highly select small press conference on Sunday February 7, Dulles stated he had had a two-hour conversation with Washington the day before, and went on to say that he would go along with Bidault on the Far East. He is clearly slated to be the scapegoat for America's irresoluteness and for the shortsighted selfishness of our Western allies.